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In the years prior to the financial crisis of 2008-09, the Federal Reserve and other central 
banks emphasized their macroeconomic policy role almost to the exclusion of other 
concerns.  The crisis experience has led to profound changes in the way we view central 
banking.  Central banking in the 21st century will give much greater emphasis to the 
original lending role and, as a consequence, the regulatory and supervisory functions of 
the lender of last resort.  In addition, central banks will be much more concerned with 
systemic risk and a new role, macroprudential regulation, is emerging.  This paper 
describes these developments with reference to the American central bank.  
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As the 20th century drew to a close, central banking seemed like a very simple activity.  
Everyone agreed that there was just one goal, one policy target and one operating 
instrument.   The goal was price stability, the policy target was a short term interest rate 
such as the Federal Funds rate and the instrument was a market-oriented intervention 
such as the ECB’s repo tenders or the Fed’s open market activity.  That simple and 
appealing consensus disappeared dramatically when the world’s financial markets faced 
unprecedented liquidity crises starting in the summer of 2007 and severe solvency crises 
a year later (see Levine 2010 for a review of the crisis and its causes).  These events 
quickly and dramatically changed the world of central banking.   
 
In the course of just a few months central banks discovered functions that had been 
largely ignored for decades.1   Central banking returned to its roots and the realization 
that financial stability might be its primary mandate.  For the first time in many years, 
lending to illiquid financial institutions became a significant policy function.  With 
increased lending and concern about the quality of collateral, central banks developed a 
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renewed interest in the supervision of banks and other financial institutions.  And, finally, 
a new role emerged as central banks struggled to develop the tools to monitor and 
manage macroprudential risks, a term that was new to the central banking literature.   
 
In the aftermath of the crisis, it is clear that modern central banks have three interrelated 
functions: macroeconomic monetary policy, the regulation and supervision of individual 
financial institutions and macro prudential regulation.  Central banking in the 21st century 
is far more complex than the late 20th century consensus.  
 
In the United States, the Federal Reserve System expanded its activities in dramatic new 
directions as the crisis unfolded in late 2008 and early 2009.  It deftly created new 
lending facilities and more than tripled its balance sheet to more than $2800 billion in 
November 2011.  The Fed’s crisis responses were innovative and unprecedented but 
relied on existing legislative authority.  More recently, the Dodd Frank Act, signed by 
President Obama on July 21, 2010, will lead to significant changes in the Federal 
Reserve’s regulatory roles and participation in future crisis responses.  Thus central 
banking in the US has changed at both the conceptual and practical level.  In the first 
instance, the balance between macroeconomic goals and the stability role has changed 
and, in the second instance, the institutional and legislative framework has changed.  
 
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 did not specify any macroeconomic goals; in fact the 
term macroeconomics was not yet in use at the time.  The original mandate of the Fed 
was to provide liquidity to the financial system in order to avoid financial panics and to 
maintain the stability of the currency.   The 1946 Employment Act established 
“maximum employment” as a goal of the Federal government and it was not until 1978 
that the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act articulated the dual mandate 
explicitly: “promote full employment…and reasonable price stability.”   As other central 
banks around the world adopted explicit inflation targets, the Fed also placed more 
emphasis on the primacy of price stability.   At the same time there was less and less 
emphasis on the financial stability concerns that led to the creation of the Fed a century 
ago.  There were a few notable occasions in the recent history of the Fed where policy 
responded boldly to financial stability concerns.  For example, the Fed provided ample 
liquidity to the financial system to mitigate the effects of the 1987 stock market crash and 
the failure of a major hedge fund (LTCM) as a consequence of the Russian financial 
crisis in 1998. 
 
The policy culture of the Greenspan-Bernanke era virtually eschewed any concern about 
the potential for systemic problems in the financial sector.  This is well illustrated by the 
debate regarding the role of policy in response to asset price bubbles.  Both Greenspan 
and Bernanke thought that there was no role for monetary policy.  Greenspan (1999) told 
Congress that policy should ‘mitigate the fallout when it occurs.’ This led famously to the 
notion that the role of the central bank is to mop up after a bubble bursts.  That is, the 
central bank has a macro policy role and should not be concerned with asset prices and 




As for the choice of policy of policy target, the Fed’s reliance on interest rates evolved 
over time as the financial system changed.   Early in the post war period, the emphasis 
was on conditions in the reserves market and the Fed monitored net borrowed reserves 
very closely.   Starting in the 1970s monetarists argued for the use of money supply 
growth as the policy target and their increasing prominence began to influence the central 
bank. The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 required the Fed to set 
money growth targets in its reports to Congress.  However, soon thereafter financial 
innovation made the velocity of standard monetary aggregates increasingly difficult to 
predict which reduced the practical value of money supply growth targets.  The Fed 
began to make greater use of a target for the Federal Funds rate.  Its targets were soon 
leaking to the press and by the mid-1990s the Fed began announcing the funds rate target 
after each policy meeting.  The overnight interest rate became the single indicator of 
policy.   
 
The Federal Reserve uses its open market operations in the secondary market for 
government securities to keep the funds rate at the target level.  The intent is to effect 
overall money market conditions rather than to influence specific institutions.   The 
emphasis on market conditions led to a virtual withering away of the discount window, 
the traditional mechanism for Fed lending to individual financial institutions.  Lending 
through the discount window was seldom more than a few hundred million dollars, 
mostly to banks that were too small to tap into the interbank market in federal funds. 
 
In summary, by the turn of the century, the Federal Reserve had evolved into the 
country’s single most important and powerful macroeconomic policy maker.  At the same 
time, the Federal Reserve had also largely lost sight of its original roles, its traditional 
lending function and the monitoring and regulating banks.  Fortunately, these functions 
had not disappeared altogether and could be quickly revived in time of crisis.2    
 
Since the 19th century, the role of the lender of last resort has been to provide funds to 
solvent but illiquid institutions; the Fed did so through the discount window.  Some 
observers, including Anna Schwartz (1992), thought that the discount window was an 
anachronism.  With well-developed money markets, solvent banks could always obtain 
liquidity from private sources and systemic needs for liquidity could be satisfied with 
open market operations.  The concern was that the very existence of the traditional 
lending facility was a temptation to provide capital loans to insolvent institutions.  The 
discount window was not closed down although it was little used for many years.  There 
were some notable exceptions, particularly the Fed’s response to the tragic events of 9/11 
that closed financial markets.  The Fed extended credit wherever disruption required it 
and discount lending was almost $12 billion for the week following 9/11.   
 
The first signs of financial crisis appeared in the summer of 2007 with problems in some 
European funds that were heavily invested in US subprime mortgage securities.  In 
September borrowing at the discount window exceeded a monthly average of $1 billion 
                                                 




for the first time in 17 years.  As the crisis unfolded, borrowings increased to $19.0 
billion in March 2008 (the month of the Bear Stearns sale) and an unprecedented $403.5 
billion in October 2008 following the Lehman bankruptcy.  In addition, to the traditional 
use of the discount window, the Fed introduced lending programs under Section 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act which allowed for virtually unlimited lending to nonbanks in a 
financial exigency.  Total lending by the Fed peaked in November 2008 at $698.8 billion.   
 
Section 13(3) was introduced in 1932 and was used sparingly in the Depression and in 
only some isolated instances afterwards (Fettig 2009).  In fact, the Federal Reserve 
declined to use it in several earlier crisis situations (e.g. the Penn Central railroad 
bankruptcy in 1970 and the near bankruptcy of New York City in 1975) that did not have 
the same systemic impact as the events of 2008.  It reversed precedent when it arranged 
the sale of Bear Stearns to Morgan Chase. By the end of 2008, there were $600 billion in 
section 13(3) loans outstanding. 
 
To critics of the Fed, the expansion of lending to specific institutions (either directly or 
through specially created funding vehicles, called the Maiden Lane corporations because 
the Federal Reserve Bank of NY is located on Maiden Lane) epitomized the central 
bank’s willingness to use government resources to bail out financial institutions and to do 
so beyond the scrutiny of any elected officials or specific legislative mandate.  To many 
other observers, the Fed’s deft and rapid use of this lending authority enabled it to 
prevent the turmoil from engulfing additional large, connected and vulnerable 
institutions.   Whether the Fed was correct to provide liquidity with such abandon or 
whether it was taking on a bailout role that exceeds the proper bounds of a central bank 
will long be debated.  However, one thing is for sure, the almost vestigial discount 
window and the almost extinct (and largely forgotten) ability to make loans under 
conditions of exigency were at the center of the Fed’s successful crisis response. 
 
Prior to the crisis, the Fed’s role in bank regulation was frequently overlooked. The 
regulation of banks and financial institutions in the United States is complex for historical 
reasons.   There are several supervisory agencies and the principal regulator for a 
particular institution depends on both its charter and its activities.  So, a state chartered 
bank will be subject to regulation at the state level except the Fed takes an interest if it is 
a member of the Federal Reserve System and the FDIC takes an interest if it has insured 
deposits.  The Federal Reserve has a central role in the system because it is the primary 
regulator for bank holding companies, foreign banks and, since the 1999 Gramm Leach 
Bliley Act permitted diversified financial firms, for financial holding companies.  Thus, 
the Fed is the primary supervisor for the largest and most diversified financial firms.   
 
Although this regulatory role has always been part of the Fed’s activities it was often a 
peripheral concern.  Bank supervision and examination are conducted by the district 
Federal Reserve Banks, far removed from the policymakers at the Board of Governors in 
Washington.    
 
Changes in the American financial industry in the decade before the crisis called for 
greater oversight by the Fed as the larger systemic financial organization grew.  The 
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aforementioned 1999 legislation allowed for the creation of ‘financial supermarkets’ that 
included banking, insurance, securities and underwriting activities; the depression era 
restrictions (Glass-Steagall) had been repealed.   In addition, there was considerable 
consolidation in the banking industry which led to the formation of several enormous 
coast to coast banks and substantial increase in concentration.    
 
A comment by Alan Greenspan that comes close to a mea culpa is telling.  Writing about 
the crisis in (2010), he wrote: 
For years the Federal Reserve had been concerned about the ever larger size of 
our financial institutions.  Federal Reserve research had been unable to find 
economies of scale in banking beyond a modest-sized institution. A decade 
ago,… I noted that “megabanks being formed by growth and consolidation are 
increasingly complex entities that create the potential for unusually large systemic 
risks in the national and international economy should they fail” [speech to the 
American Bankers Association, October 11, 1999]. Regrettably, we did little to 
address the problem. 
The changing landscape of American finance called for a more proactive regulatory role 
which was not forthcoming. 
 
Nonetheless, the existing central bank regulatory role was of great importance when the 
crisis struck.  The innovative and rapid lending responses in the crisis would have been 
difficult in the absence of extensive hands on experience in the financial system on the 
part of Fed supervisory personnel.    The skills and expertise developed in the course of 
bank regulation and supervision are of great value when a crisis strikes.  The Fed’s 
experienced staff was able to directly address the management issues and balance sheet 
evaluations of failed or nearly failing institutions.  There was no substitute for the inside 
knowledge that comes with a long standing supervisory relationship. 
 
The turn of the century Fed focused on macroeconomic monetary policy but its historical 
lending function and regulatory role gave it the wherewithal to respond creatively and 
aggressively when the crisis struck in fall 2008.  Before the crisis had subsided, Congress 
turned its attention to improving financial sector regulation and to way to avert future 
crises. These discussions culminated in the passage of the Dodd Frank Act which 
addresses numerous regulatory issues and has an impact on the Fed in several important 
ways.   In some instances it expands the role of the Fed and in others it constrains it.  
 
The Fed was severely criticized for its role in the so-called bank bailout during the crisis.  
For example, there was a great deal of anger about its lending to AIG which enabled the 
insurance company to pay its counterparties in derivatives transactions which included 
many of the largest financial companies.   It is possible to argue that these interventions 
forestalled a complete meltdown of the American capital markets but it is equally 
plausible to view these loans as an inappropriate government bailout.  The public anger 
was further exacerbated when AIG paid out its contractual bonus commitments to 
employees.  Many would have preferred a bankruptcy which would have placed the 
bonus recipients in the back of a long line of creditors.  However, the Fed did not believe 




These attitudes are reflected in the Dodd Frank legislation which places significant 
restrictions on the Fed’s emergency lending abilities to non-banks.   First, such lending 
must be part of a program with broad eligibility rather than lending aimed at a specific 
institution.  Second, it states that such lending “is for the purpose of providing 
liquidity…, and not to aid a failing financial company.”  Third, the Secretary of Treasury 
must approve any such lending program.  It is curious why the Treasury Secretary should 
play a role in lending that is designed to provide liquidity with adequately collateralized 
loans.  Fourth, the lending should only be done against adequate collateral and when the 
borrower can be expected to pay back the loan.  The approach in the legislation could 
raise concerns about the Fed’s independence.  However, only experience will determine 
whether these restrictions will inhibit the ability of the central bank to respond to another 
crisis. 
 
Congress was grappling with difficult problems.  First, an emergency lending facility 
may be extremely important but it needs to be restrained to avoid moral hazard on the 
part of firms that are generally viewed as too big to fail.  Second, in a crisis, it is often 
impossible to distinguish between the provision of liquidity and bailing out a failing firm.  
The former is an appropriate function of an independent central bank but the latter is a 
fiscal decision that should be left in the hands of the political authorities.  To be sure, a 
central bank in a democratic society should be subject to review and held accountable by 
elected officials.  However, the experiences in 2008 illustrate the value of being able to 
make timely interventions in response to truly systemic shocks.  
 
At the same time Dodd Frank makes financial stability an explicit central bank objective; 
specifically, it establishes a new Vice Chair for Supervision at the Board of Governors.  
Thus, the legislation – at least implicitly – ratifies the Fed’s aggressive crisis responses.  
Further, Dodd Frank introduces new mechanisms for regulating systemically important 
financial institutions.  The Federal Reserve is one of several major players in a complex 
structure that is only now being put into place. 
 
The Federal Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) is the new systemic regulator.  It 
consists of all the major financial institution regulators, including the Fed, and will rely 
on the advice of a new Office of Financial Research being established in the Treasury 
Department.   The FSOC will be able to determine which nonbank financial companies 
(in addition to bank holding companies with assets in excess of $50 billion) are 
systemically important.  It can then authorize the Fed to impose additional capital and 
liquidity requirements on such firms.  The act also requires systemically important firms 
to develop “living wills” which provide for their orderly resolution but the Fed’s role in 
this process is secondary. 
 
To a large extent, the Fed already had the authority to extend supervision over nonbanks 
but it failed to recognize the systemic risks that arose with the growth of the shadow 
banking system.  The key question regarding the regulation of systemically important 
institutions introduced by Dodd Frank is whether the complex new apparatus will be able 
to respond dynamically to financial sector innovation.  The explicit recognition of 
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systemic risk is a step in the right direction but it is uncertain how effectively the 
regulators will be able to coordinate among an analytics group (the Treasury Office of 
Financial Research), a deliberative body (the FSOC that determines which institutions are 
systemically important and authorizes the Fed to enact regulation) and the regulator (the 
Federal Reserve).   This will be particularly difficult in the presence of large systemically 
important financial institutions that use their extensive resources to influence government 
rule making.  
 
There are additional elements of the Dodd Frank legislation which effect the Fed but they 
are of lesser significance.   The legislative requires the Fed to disclose (with a delay of 
usually two years) extensive information on all its lending programs, including the names 
of borrowers, amounts borrowed and the terms.  This breach in traditional central bank 
secrecy was viewed with some concern.  All the details of the Fed’s crisis lending are 
already available on the Board web site and there do not seem to be any negative effects.  
Finally, there was much discussion of a possibly too-cozy relationship between the 
Federal Reserve and the financial industry which led to various proposals to change Fed 
governance, introduce policy audits and politicize top appointments at the Fed. Dodd 
Frank does include some modest changes in governance procedures but nothing to 
fundamentally compromise its independence. 
 
When all is said and done, the Federal Reserve today is very different than the turn of the 
century view of the central bank presented earlier.  Although that view – the exclusive 
macro policy role – might have been an over simplification of how the central bank 
operated, it is also clear that central banking has changed profoundly.  The Federal 
Reserve, as a consequence of both its crisis experiences and the post-crisis legislative 
changes, is a different institution than it was a decade ago.   
 
Modern central banks function in three areas: monetary policy, supervision and 
regulation of individual financial institutions and the systemic regulation of the financial 
sector as a whole.   A clear lesson from the crisis is that central banks in the 21st century 
will have to manage all three functions simultaneously. Until recently, the relationships 
among these three areas have been widely underappreciated.  
 
Very few would argue with the idea that monetary policy aimed at economic stabilization 
should rest in the hands of an independent central bank.  Economists have shown that 
independent central banks achieve lower and less volatile inflation rates than those that 
are beholden to governments in power, and that they do so at no long-run cost to 
economic output.   Some still argue that the function of a central bank should begin and 
end with the macro objectives of monetary policy, and that any other obligation would 
distract the central bank from achieving its primary goal of economic stabilization (or 
specifically, price stability).  However, this approach ignores important links between 
monetary policy-making, financial regulation, and prudential supervision that favour a 
wider role for a modern central bank. In addition to its macroeconomic effects, monetary 
policy can affect the behaviour of financial institutions and may create weaknesses in the 




An example of theses linkages is the monetary policy pursued by the Federal Reserve in 
the early 2000s. The Fed began reducing its target for the funds rate even before the 
economy started contracting and it fell rapidly from 6% to 1.75% during 2001. Although 
the expansion began in November 2001, the funds rate target was reduced again at the 
end of 2002 and in mid-2003. It reached a record (at that time) low of 1% in June 2003 
and was held at that level for 12 months. Thus, the first increase in the funds rate target 
occurred 29 months after the end of the recession. By one measure the real Fed funds rate 
was negative five years.  In its policy discussions at that time, the Fed expressed concern 
about deflation and the weakness of a recovery that was almost two years old. Although, 
there was some mention of issues that became more important in later years – mortgage 
refinancing, accounting practices at the GSEs and ‘buoyant’ growth of M2 - the upside 
and downside risks regarding the two macro goals dominated the policy discussions.   
 
Although it would be unfair to blame the Fed’s policymaking in the early 2000s for all 
the systemic problems that arose later in the decade, the emphasis on macro conditions 
and meant that no one within the Fed or elsewhere was even asking whether monetary 
policy might have systemic credit market consequences. Subsequent events show that 21st 
century central banking should avoid this disconnect between macro monetary policy and 
its other functions. 
Central banks started as banks with important lending activities, both on a regular basis 
and as the lender of last resort. The monetary policy function of central banks grew out of 
their lending activities as early central banks discovered that their lending influenced 
credit availability, interest rates and gold flows even before macroeconomic policy 
became an acknowledged role. As a regular lender to the financial system and sometimes 
lender of last resort when special liquidity problems threatened the operation of the 
banking system, the central bank had a clear interest in knowing the viability of its 
customers. Any lender should have sufficient information about borrowers to be able to 
make sound loans. Thus, it is no accident that the lender of last resort also played a role 
with bank regulatory and supervisory functions.  
The lending activities of the Federal Reserve System became less significant in the late 
20th century as the threat of banking panics retreated once deposit insurance was 
introduced and as other means to obtain liquidity developed.  Bank regulation became a 
less crucial element of Fed activity.  In the United Kingdom, bank regulation was moved 
entirely out of the Bank of England, to the Financial Supervisory Authority, although that 
is being reversed.  The fact that the European Central Bank has no direct role in bank 
supervision has led to difficulties in responding to some aspects of the Euro crisis. 
The crisis experience demonstrated the continuing 21st century relevance of central bank 
lending capabilities.   As long as lending continues to be an important central banking 
role, it is crucial that the lender be able to obtain timely information about any potential 
borrower. This is a key ground for the argument that the central bank should have a role 
in bank supervision and regulation. The central bank needs to know its customers.  
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The benefits of linking the lender of last resort and supervision go beyond the advantages 
of rapid communication. The skills and expertise developed in the course of regulation 
and supervision may help the lender of last resort to innovate when necessary in a 
liquidity crisis.  Similarly, experience in regulation and supervision may be critical for 
the development of effective systemic risk regulation. 
The scope of bank regulatory activities that should be under the direction of the central 
bank is a complex issue.  The lender of last resort role is of greatest relevance in dealing 
with institutions whose instability would pose a direct threat to the financial system as a 
whole. The experience of the recent crisis suggests that large, complex financial 
institutions (LCFIs) are more likely to be sources of systemic disruption. For this reason, 
there would appear to be a stronger case for linking the lender of last resort to the 
supervision of LCFIs than to the supervision of other financial institutions.  The Dodd 
Frank bill recognizes that the set of institutions that can present systemic risks includes 
financial institutions other than banks.  During the financial panic, the Fed had to 
scramble to make up for the fact that it had little connection to the shadow banking 
system. 
Although systemic risk is not a new idea, the notion of an explicit systemic-risk 
regulatory function is new. Addressing systemic threats was an implicit function of the 
Fed because its lender of last resort facility was the only tool available to respond to 
systemic risks. When clearing failures, Y2K concerns, or the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
threatened the operation of the financial system, the Fed’s discount window was used to 
address the problems. The availability of the discount window for emergency lending 
made it the central bank’s tool for responding to systemic operational failures. 
Lending facilities might be the tool for responding to systemic problems but the 
establishment of a macro-prudential regulator is a different issue.  The regulator should 
be able to monitor and measure systemic risks and take regulatory actions to reduce them 
before they erupt into crisis. The central bank is well suited for this role because of its 
existing connections to the financial system and, as the recent crisis highlights, it is 
valuable to have one authority unambiguously responsible for responding to systemic 
risks.  As noted earlier, the Dodd-Frank bill establishes a systemic regulatory function for 
the United States but it is one that the Fed will share with the interagency Financial 
Stability Oversight Council.   
A systemic-risk regulator should have influence that stretches out in multiple directions. 
First, the systemic regulator needs to augment the oversight and supervision of 
institutions that are so large and interconnected that any insolvency would create 
systemic problems. Second, it must be able to address systemic problems that can arise 
from smaller institutions facing a common vulnerability. Third, the systemic regulator 
must have authority over the shadow banking system including any new institutions or 
instruments that may create new systemic risks. An important contributor to the crisis 
was shadow bank institutions – such as broker-dealers – that are dependent on the 
collateralized repo market.  Fourth, economic conditions can give rise to systemically 
risky activity. Rapid credit expansion, the deterioration of credit standards and asset price 
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bubbles are all macro problems that can give rise to systemic weaknesses. The new term, 
macro-prudential regulation, reflects the post-crisis realization that monetary policy needs 
to stay cognizant of the systemic stability implications of policy.  
As a consequence of the crisis experience, the Fed and other central banks have tools that 
can be used to respond to systemic problems.  But, systemic regulation goes beyond the 
tools for crisis responses.  First, as long as the central bank has the authority to lend in 
emergency situations, it should, as argued above, have a role in the regulation of 
institutions that might present systemic risks. Second, systemic risk regulation needs to 
develop risk standards for the financial sector as a whole, a macro-prudential policy. 
Little is known about the tools for measuring systemic risks and the instruments to 
regulate it.  A framework for macro prudential policy is at an early stage of development 
through the FSOC in the US as well as elsewhere.  Systemic risk may not be a new idea 
but systemic risk management and macro prudential regulation are. 
Experience has taught us how, for example, to set minimum capital requirements for an 
individual institution operating in a normal environment. But there is little experience in 
determining the extra buffers that systemically important institutions and the system as a 
whole need to maintain in the presence of a systemic shock or crisis.  
Monetary authorities in both the US and Europe quickly introduced some efforts at 
prudential management in the immediate aftermath of the crisis in the form of ‘stress’ 
tests. These tests postulate a macroeconomic shock and simulate its effect on the balance 
sheet of financial institutions in order to determine whether the banks have sufficient 
capital to cope with the hypothesized stress. The Federal Reserve’s initial stress tests 
were conducted on the 19 largest bank holding companies in the U.S. The results, 
announced in May 2009, had a calming effect on financial markets because the capital 
shortfalls were less than had been feared.  
In conclusion, monetary policy, the regulation of financial institutions and macro-
prudential regulation are tightly linked together. As a result an argument can be made for 
giving the central bank a role in all three. Even if we view macro policy to be the primary 
function of the central bank, it needs to monitor financial institutions because no macro 
policy can succeed without financial stability. And since economic stability goals cannot 
be attained without financial stability, the macroeconomic and macro-prudential roles are 
tied together. The micro-regulatory role is tied in as well since large complex institutions 
as well as panics among smaller institutions can have systemic implications.  
These broad roles for the 21st century central bank do not come without risks. The 
emergency responses to crisis, such as those put in place in 2008-09, may cross the line 
into fiscal policy and involve political judgments which might compromise the 
independence of the central bank and its ability to pursue its primary macro role.  
Goodfriend (2010) warns that central bank bailouts are politically contentious fiscal 
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decisions that can destroy its independence.3 Policy makers were aware that their 
innovative responses to the crisis increased the political involvement of the Fed. In the 
height of the crisis, in March 2009, the Fed and the Treasury issued a statement outlining 
their respective roles and the distinction among them.  The 2010 Dodd-Frank bill will 
result in power sharing with other regulators and the Treasury in the potentially 
politically contentious area of systemic risk management. 
Thus, central banks will be operating with broader roles than in the late 20th century and 
in a possibly much more political environment.  The world of central banking will never 





                                                 
3  Meltzer (2010) suggests that the Fed as never been completely free of politics.  Its 
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